Using a comprehensive panel data set of China's state-owned enterprises, we investigate the impacts of privatization, of different time sequences and extent of non-state ownership, on social welfare and firm performance. Attention has been focused on the sources of gain in the firm performance and the long-run impacts of privatization. It is found that privatization of China's state-owned enterprises was achieved with limited compromise on the social welfare responsibilities, and much gain in firm performance was obtained by motivating the management and reducing the agency cost at the management level. 
Introduction
An issue of perennial research interest is why certain organizations persist over time despite of their inefficiency. A case in point is China's state-owned enterprises. The stateowned enterprises have poor financial performance as compared with China's private enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises operating in China. 1 The existence of some of the state-owned enterprises cannot be justified even from the social welfare point of view.
Yet China's state-owned enterprises are slow to undergo privatization. 2 It is understood that an organization, once in existence, will lead to the formation of various interest groups, and any organizational change is resisted by those groups whose interests are to be adversely affected. Thus the key to understand organizational changes lies in the delineation of relevant interest groups and analysis of their payoff changes in the processes. 3 Using a comprehensive panel data set of Chinese enterprises, we investigate how the interests of various parties of the state-owned enterprises are affected during the privatization process. It is found that privatization of China's state-owned enterprises was achieved with little compromise on the social welfare responsibilities, and much gain in post-privatization firm performance was achieved by motivating management and reducing the agency cost at the management level.
In general, an enterprise has various interest parties: suppliers, customers, and governments. Suppliers (including those of labor services, management services, capital inputs, and other inputs) would like the enterprise to pay higher prices for the inputs, customers prefer the enterprise to set lower prices for its outputs, and the governments like to collect more taxes from the enterprise. However, the owners of the enterprise are the key stakeholders with the objective of profit maximization. They manage the 1 Indeed, studies have shown that reform and privatization of China's state-owned enterprises have led to significant improvements in efficiency and performance (Gordon and Li, 1995; Naughton, 1994, 1995; Li, 1997; Li and Xu, 2004; Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao, 2001) . See Djankov and Murrell (2002) for a survey of enterprise restructuring in the transition economies, and Megginson and Netter (2001) for a survey of privatization in both developed and developing economies. 2 There are studies focusing on the incentives for the Chinese central and local governments to privatize its state-owned enterprises (Bai, Lu, and Tao, 2005; Guo and Yao, 2005; Li and Lui, 2004) . 3 For a recent study on the role of interest parties for and against privatization in the telecom sector, see Li and Xu (2002) .
In this study, we look at the following indicators of firm performance and social welfare responsibilities. There are: (1) social welfare indicators on labor (size of employment, wage per employee, and welfare per employee), consumers (price index), and governments (tax payments, inclusive and exclusive of the value-added taxes), (2) indicators on firm profitability and productivity (logarithm of total assets, logarithm of sales, operating income to sales, operating income to total assets, operating income per employee, and sales per employee), and (3) individual components of the operating income to sales (profits from the main products to sales, profits from other products to sales, managerial expenses to sales, and financial expenses to sales).
Our results show that the extent of labor layoffs in China's privatization is not as significant as those in many other countries (La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999) .
While those laid off are worse off in the privatization process, those retained actually have benefited from having higher wage and welfare. Regarding the impact of privatization on other social welfare objectives, we find that price index decreases with the extent of privatization (i.e., consumers benefit from the privatization) while there is no statistically significant change in the tax obligation. Both firm profitability and productivity are found to increase in the percentage of non-state ownership or the extent of privatization. In addition, much of the improvement in the operating income to sales comes from the reduction in managerial expenses to sales (53.85%) and the decrease in financial expenses to sales (35.91%). To conclude, our analysis suggests that privatization of China's state-owned enterprises is achieved with limited compromise on the social welfare responsibilities, and much of the improvement in the firm performance comes from the reduction in the agency cost at the management level. Anecdotal evidence does suggest that state-owned enterprises generally have bloated management structure with excessive amount of managerial expenses. It is because the State Assets Agency has multiple objectives, and so long as the management meets those objectives it is neither motivated nor disciplined for profit maximization. Hence the challenge for privatization of state-owned enterprises lies in transferring the control of state-owned enterprises from the State Assets Agency to the shareholders, and then introducing incentive and/or disciplinary mechanisms for the management to pursue profit 5 maximization. Given that the size of employment decreased with the extent of privatization, the other challenge for privatization of state-owned enterprises is to protect the interests of those unlucky workers (Bai, Li, Tao, and Wang, 2000) .
Unlike the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, China has taken a gradual approach to privatizing its state-owned enterprises. Therefore there might be subsequent privatization after the initial (partial) privatization. Indeed in our sample there are firms that went through up to four rounds of partial privatization. It is therefore important to know if the first partial privatization works or if the subsequent rounds of privatization add any value. It is also interesting to know if there is any threshold level of non-state ownership (say, 50%) above which there will be significant effects of privatization. We find that the first privatization has the largest and statistically significant impact on profitability (operating income to total assets and operating income to sales) and productivity (operating income per employee and sales per employee). The second privatization still has some impact, but the subsequent ones do not. The combined extent of privatization in the first and second rounds could be either above or below 50%.
Consistently we find that both privatization with non-state ownership more than 50% and that with less than 50% non-state ownership have significant impacts on firm profitability and productivity, though the former one has stronger effects than the latter one.
An important indicator for the success of organizational changes such as the privatization of China's state-owned enterprises is the sustained improvement in performance in the long run. Under-reporting financial performance prior to the privatization does not lead to sustainable success in the long run; nor does the one-time government subsidies at the privatization (Frydman, Gary, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 1999; Song and Yao, 2004) . To address this concern, we look at the long-run performance of privatized firms, and find that there is sustainable improvement in the profitability and productivity up to four years after the privatization. Furthermore, the main source of the sustained performance improvement remains the reduction of managerial expenses. This suggests that, once a state-owned enterprise is privatized through either management buyout or by outside investors, there emerge real (not nominal) and active shareholders who would put 6 pressure on the State Assets Agency or the board of directors to pursue profit maximization. Incentive and/or disciplinary systems are then put in place to streamline and motivate the management, which leads to sustainable performance improvement in the long run.
In establishing the impact of privatization on firm performance, we need to control for the potential selection bias problem that firms undergoing privatization may have some unobserved characteristics explaining their superior post-privatization performance. As
China has taken a gradual and selective approach to privatizing its state-owned enterprises (Cao, Qian, and Weingast, 1999) , the selection bias problem is a serious concern. To deal with this issue, we use the firm fixed-effect estimation method in case that there are unobserved firm-specific time-invariant factors influencing firm performance. There could also be unobserved time-variant factors affecting differently on firms that underwent privatization from those that did not. To control for this possibility, we focus on a sub-sample of 2,866 firms that all had privatization in the sample period The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe our sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises, and offer some summary statistics. The method of econometric analysis and the results are presented in Section 3. The paper concludes with Section 4.
Data
Our data is based on the annual surveys of manufacturing and mining firms conducted by Tables 1a and 1b give, respectively, the absolute number and percentage of first privatization during the entire sample period. Medical and pharmaceutical products had 4 The numbers of firms surveyed from 1998 to 2003 are, respectively, 164,981, 161,888, 162,755, 171,117, 181,428, and 196,222. 5 We use the panel data set to examine whether subsequent privatization adds any value to the initial privatization, and also investigate the long-run impacts of partial privatization. 6 For each enterprise the data set has information on its sources of capital. China's National Bureau of Statistics classifies six possible sources of capital: state-owned capital, collectively-owned capital, private capital, capital from HMT (Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) investors, capital from foreign investors, and legal-person capital, the last of which can be further classified into state-owned legal-person capital and collectively-owned legal-person capital and be combined with state-owned capital and collectively-owned capital respectively. 7 Any decrease in state ownership is referred to as privatization. Here we do not further classify privatization by the types of new capital, which could be collectively-owned, privately owned, HMT ownership, or foreign ownership. Frydman, Gary, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) analyzed how the benefits of privatization might vary with respect to the types of new, non-state ownership. There are other types of restructuring and privatization in China, such as share-issuing privatization (Sun and Tong, 2003; Wang, Xu and Zhu, 2004) , shareholding ownership (Jefferson and Su, 2005) , and privatization of township and village enterprises (Li and Rozelle, 2000 and nonmetal mineral products (26.06%). Other minerals mining and dressing was the only industry that had no privatization at all during the sample period, followed by production and supply of tap water (3.95%), tobacco processing (3.97%), petroleum and natural gas extraction (5%), and logging and transport of timber and bamboo (7.41%).
For each of the 31 Chinese regions, Tables 1c and 1d give, respectively, the absolute number and percentage of first privatization during the sample period. Jiangsu province had the highest percentage of first privatization (45.44%), followed by Shandong (31.38%) and Sichuan (31.16%). Tianjin had the lowest percentage of first privatization (4.13%), with Guizhou (6.36%) and Tibet (7.14%) being the second and third lowest of the 31 Chinese regions.
Among the 15,496 enterprises that were 100% state-owned in 1998, 2,866 had (first-time)
privatization during the remaining sample period (i.e., 1999-2003) . Four hundred seventy-one of the 2,866 enterprises had a subsequent (second-time) privatization; 90 out of the 471 enterprises had the third-time privatization; and finally, 13 out of the 90 enterprises had the fourth-time privatization. See Table 2 for details. Sixty five percent of the first privatization was complete privatization (i.e., zero state-ownership), with the corresponding numbers for the second, third and fourth privatization being 54%, 51%, and 54%, respectively. Seventy five percent of the first privatization led to majority control by non-state ownership (i.e., less than 50% state-ownership), with the corresponding numbers for the second, third, and fourth privatization being 74%, 73%, and 85%, respectively.
We examine the impact of privatization using two sets of indicators: one for social welfare responsibilities and the other for firm performance. The set of indicators for social welfare responsibilities measure the effects of privatization on labor (logarithm of employment, wage per employee, and welfare per employee), consumers (price index), and governments (tax payments), where price index is the ratio of current value of total output to constant value (in 1990 price) of total output, and tax payments are those inclusive of value-added taxes and those exclusive of value-added taxes. 8 The set of indicators for firm performance include: size of operation (logarithm of total assets, and logarithm of sales), profitability (operating income to total assets and operating income to sales), and productivity (operating income per employee and sales per employee). To investigate further the sources for the increase in firm profitability, we decompose operating income to sales into four components: profits from main products, profits from other products, managerial expenses to sales, and financial expenses to sales.
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The definition of the above indicators on social welfare responsibilities and firm performance is summarized in Table 3 .
Econometric analysis

The impact of privatization on social welfare and firm profitability
To establish the exact effect of privatization on firm performance, we need to control for the potential selection bias problem. China has taken a gradual and selective approach to privatizing its state-owned enterprises. This raises the issue of whether the performance change of privatized firms really comes from their ownership change or it is due to some unobserved features of those state-owned enterprises selected for privatization. 10 Ideally all aspects of privatized firms, both time-variant and time-invariant, need to be taken into consideration before the residual in performance is assigned to the ownership effect. In practice, we do not have the complete list of time-variant and time-invariant variables, 8 As value-added taxes tend to fluctuate with inventories across years, the tax payments both inclusive and exclusive of the value-added taxes are used to measure the contributions made by the enterprises to government tax revenue. 9 Operating income is the sum of profits from main products and profits from other products, minus the managerial expenses and financial expenses. Profits from main products equal to net sales revenue minus production cost, sales costs, and sales taxes; Managerial expenses include all the expenses incurred for the administrative purposes, such as salary and welfare, entertaining costs, meeting expenses, and traveling expenses of administrative staff; Financial expenses include net interests paid and commission charged by banks. 10 Similarly, in deciding whether to privatize state-owned enterprises, China's local and central governments may consider its impacts on social welfare, and hence the possible selection bias problem.
and we compensate that by using two estimation strategies. First, privatized firms may have some unobserved firm-specific and time-invariant characteristics that could explain their superior performance. To address this concern, we follow Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczyski (1999) and Gupta (2005) by estimating firm fixed-effect models that could account for those unobserved firm-specific and time-invariant characteristics.
Second, it is also possible that there are some time-variant characteristics separating state-owned firms that were privatized from those that did not. To address this concern, we restrict our sample to those state-owned enterprises that were privatized from 1999 to state-owned enterprises that were privatized in later years may share some time-variant characteristics with those privatized in earlier years, and therefore they are a better comparison group than those never privatized in the sample period. To summarize, we first estimate the following benchmark model using a sample of 2,866 enterprises that were state-owned in 1998 but were privatized in the remaining sample period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . HHI on the performance indicators will not be formally discussed. Table 4 Price index is found to decrease with the extent of privatization, suggesting that consumers are better off in the privatization process. This is in contrast to the literature result that once privatized the former state-owned enterprises are no longer subject to government regulations and hence tend to raise prices for their products and services (La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999) . Besides the social welfare responsibilities to workers and customers, state-owned enterprises are also expected to provide a significant share of tax revenue for governments to undertake public-good projects. Studies have also revealed that, even with the same tax rates, state-owned enterprises have much less incentives to hide business activities and evade taxation than privately-owned companies (Cai, Liu and Xiao, 2004) . It is thus conjectured that the tax payments shall decrease with the extent of privatization. However, our estimation results show that privatization has no statistically significant effect on the tax payments, both inclusive and exclusive of value-11 Surplus labor ratio is defined as the percentage of workers who would be laid off if the company were operating at the industry-average level of sales per capita. It is equal to
, and L (or S) is the industry-average employment (or sales) calculated at the 2-digit industry level using annual surveys on manufacturing firms of year t ; debt assets ratio equals to total liabilities to total assets of firm i in year t ; new products ratio is the percentage of new products in total outputs. Under China's statistical classification, a product is considered new if it is produced for the first time in an industry or a region, and such status is given only for the first four years of production.
added taxes. To the extent that privatization leads to greater sales and higher operating income, our results still lend support to the conjectured decrease in the tax payments.
Panel B is about the impact of privatization on firm performance. The logarithm of sales increases in the extent of privatization, but the logarithm of total assets decreases in the percentage of non-state ownership. Two measures of profitability, operating income to sales and operating income to total assets, are increasing in the percentage of non-state ownership, both with 1% statistical significance. In addition, two measures of labor productivity, operating income per employee and sales per employee, are also increasing with the extent of privatization, again both with 1% statistical significance. Taken together, results summarized in panels A and B reveal that privatized firms employ fewer workers and work with fewer assets, but they manage to achieve higher sales and operating income. Clearly the privatization leads to significant improvements in firm performance.
For owners of the privatized firms, operating income to sales is one of the most important measures of firm performance. To better understand the sources of gain in the operating income to sales, we examine its individual components: (1) profits from main products to sales, (2) profits from other products to sales, (3) managerial expenses to sales, and (4) financial expenses to sales. The operating income to sales is the sum of (1) and (2), minus (3) and (4). As shown in Panel C, higher (post-privatization) operating income to sales comes from lower managerial expenses to sales, lower financial expenses to sales, higher profits from main products to sales, and yet lower profits from other products to sales, with the first three being 1% statistical significant and the last one being 5% statistical significant. More importantly, the reduction in the managerial expenses to sales and that in the financial expenses to sales contributed, respectively, 53.85% and 35.91% of the gain in the operating income to sales. In contrast, the profits from main and other products to sales contributed a combined 10.24% of the gain in the operating income to sales. These results reveal that much of the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises lies in the agency cost at the management level. China's state-owned enterprises, though nominally owned by all people in the society, are effectively captured by the State Assets 13 Agency, which has multiple social welfare objectives other than profit maximization and appoints management to meet those objectives. The management of state-owned enterprises is neither motivated nor disciplined to pursue profit maximization. Without legitimized ownership to the cash flows of state-owned enterprises, the management cares more about the size of the operation than the bottom line, and enjoys the perks accompanying with the scale of the operation, resulting in severe agency cost at the management level. With privatization, however, there emerge real (not nominal) and active shareholders, who put pressure on the State Assets Agency or the board of directors to pursuer profit maximization and motivate management for that objective.
From the estimation results of benchmark model (1), we can conclude that privatization of China's state-owned enterprises was achieved with limited compromise on the social welfare responsibilities, and much gain was obtained by motivating and monitoring management for profit maximization.
Partial privatization
China has taken a gradual approach to privatizing its state-owned enterprises. Initial privatization tends to be partial in scope, and is often followed by subsequent privatization. It is thus interesting to know if the first (often partial) privatization works in terms of its impact on social welfare and firm performance, or whether the subsequent privatization adds any value to the first privatization. To investigating the effects of initial and subsequent privatization, we replace the percentage of non-state ownership of model (1) because firms in our sample went through at most four rounds of partial privatization. Table 5 are almost the same as those of the percentage of non-state ownership in Table 4 . Specifically, with the first privatization, (1) the size of employment decreases, but both the wage per employee and welfare per employee increase, (2) the logarithm of sales increases, (3) both the operating income to total assets and the operating income to sales increase, (4) both operating income per employee and sales per employee increase, and (5) much of the gain in the operating income to sales comes from the reduction in the managerial expenses to sales and the reduction in the financial expenses to sales, but not from the increase in the profits from main and other products. The results on price index and the logarithm of total assets are no longer statistically significant. The only different and statistically significant result is that the tax payments, both inclusive and exclusive of the value-added taxes, actually increased after the first privatization. Thus we can conclude that the first privatization works wonder no matter how partial it is. As for the benefits of subsequent privatization, we find that the second-time privatization still adds value in terms of greater operation (logarithm of sales), higher firm profitability (operating income to total assets and operating income to sales) and higher firm productivity (operating income per employee). With the secondtime privatization, the size of employment reversed its decline and started to increase, but the wage and welfare per employee continued to increase. The tax payments (both inclusive and exclusive of value-added taxes) continued to increase. Our results, however,
show that any further (third-time or fourth-time) privatization adds little value in almost all the performance indicators.
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The results on the first and subsequent privatization seem to suggest that the scope of privatization is not critically important in the case of China. One may argue, however, that in our sample 75% of the state-owned enterprises undergoing for the first privatization were no longer state-controlled (i.e., less than 50% state ownership) and an additional 45% of the state-owned enterprises undergoing for the second privatization were controlled by non-state owners (see Table 2 firm i is lower or equal to fifty percent in year t and zero otherwise. As shown in Table 6 , firm profitability (measured by operating income to total assets and operating income to sales) improves after the privatization, regardless who has the majority control; so do the two measures of productivity (operating income per employee and sales per employee).
However, judging by the size of coefficients, privatization that resulted in majority control by non-state owners has bigger impacts on firm profitability and productivity than privatization with the state retaining more than 50% ownership. For privatization with majority non-state ownership, much of the gain in the operating income to sales still comes from the reduction of managerial expenses to sales, reduction of financial expenses to sales, and profits from main products (in the decreasing order of importance); but the reduction of managerial expenses to sales is no longer a major source of gain for privatization with minority non-state ownership. On the social welfare responsibilities, 16 both privatization with majority non-state ownership and that with minority non-state ownership have positive impacts on the wage and welfare per employee. However, the size of employment increased and the price index also increased under privatization with minority non-state ownership, while both decreased under privatization with majority non-state ownership. On the tax payments, only privatization with minority non-state ownership has positive and statistically significant impact.
Taken together, our results on partial privatization (first versus subsequent privatization, and privatization with the state retaining more than 50% ownership versus that with less than 50% state ownership) suggest that, no matter how limited the scope of the privatization is, it introduces real (not nominal) and active shareholders who put pressure on the State Assets Agency or the board of directors to pursue profit maximization instead of some social welfare objectives. Incentive systems are then put in place to motivate management to streamline the management structure (i.e., reducing the agency cost) and improve firm performance and productivity.
Long-run impact of privatization
The analysis in the previous two sections has found significant impact of privatization on firm performance and social welfare responsibilities. The estimation models (1)-(3) used in the analysis, however, impose a restriction of uniform impact of privatization (the percentage of non-state ownership) across the sample period. There is anecdotal evidence that state-owned enterprises tend to take actions of short-term and non-lasting effects, such as under-reporting financial performance prior to privatization or receiving large one-off subsidies during the privatization process. However the success of privatization of China's state-owned enterprises hinges upon sustained impacts on firm performance and social welfare responsibilities. To investigate the long-run impact of privatization, we modify model (1) by replacing the percentage of non-state ownership by four interaction terms between the percentages of non-state ownership with dummy variables indicating the number of years after the initial privatization (Song and Yao, 2005 As shown in Table 7 , the negative impact of non-state ownership on the size of employment was steady and significant up to four years after the privatization, while the positive effects of non-state ownership on the wage and welfare per employee increased throughout the post-privatization period. The price index did not have any statistically significant change in the first year of privatization, but then had pronounced decrease up to four years after the privatization. As in our benchmark case (model (1)), the impact of non-state ownership on the tax payments was insignificant and remained so in the postprivatization period.
The increase in firm profitability (operating income to total assets and operating income to sales) was significant in the first two years after the privatization, and then became steady. Possibly due to the steady decrease in the size of employment, the improvement in firm productivity (operating income per employee and sales per employee) was significant and increasing throughout the post-privatization period. As in our benchmark case (model (1)), much of the gain in the operating income to sales comes from the reduction in the managerial expenses to sales, the reduction in the financial expenses to sales, but not from the increase in the profits from main products. More significantly, the decrease in the managerial expenses to sales and that in the financial expenses to sales were significant and increasing throughout the post-privatization period. In contrast, the increase in the profits from main products was significant only up to two years after the privatization. With a survey data of 218 privatized and state-owned enterprises in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Frydman, Gary, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) found immediate but no sustained impact of privatization. Based on a data set of over 6,000 privatized and state-owned enterprises in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia, Claessens and Djankov (2002) found that the impacts of privatization were small at the beginning but then grew over time. Song and Yao (2004) used a relatively small sample of Chinese firms and found no immediate but gradual and sustained effects of privatization. Our analysis shows that there was both immediate and sustained improvement in firm profitability and productivity throughout the post-privatization period, and it lends strong support to the success of privatization of China's state-owned enterprises.
Conclusion
Since China started its economic reform in late 1970s, its economy has experienced one of the most spectacular growths in its recent history. Much of China's economic growth, however, has been driven by its private enterprises, whose property rights protection was China's state-owned enterprises to investigate the impacts of privatization on the social welfare responsibilities and firm performance. We found that the privatization of China's state-owned enterprises was achieved with limited compromise on the social welfare responsibilities: (1) privatization had a negative impact on the size of employment, but those employees who retained their jobs had their wage and welfare increased, (2) the price index decreased with the extent of privatization, suggesting that consumers benefited from the process, and (3) there was no statistically significant impact on the tax payments, both inclusive and exclusive of the value added taxes. We found that privatization had significant impact on firm performance: (1) logarithm of total assets decreased but the logarithm of sales increased with the extent of privatization, (2) both operating income to sales and operating income to total assets increased with the percentage of non-state ownership, and (3) both operating income per employee and sales per employee increased with the extent of privatization. The gain in the operating income to sales -a key measure for firm performance -was found to come from, in the order of decreasing importance, (1) the decrease in the managerial expenses to sales, (2) the 20 decrease in the financial expenses to sales, and (3) the increase in profit from main and other products. We also examined the robustness of our results to the sequence and extent of privatization, and investigated if there was any sustained impact of privatization on social welfare responsibilities and firm performance in the long run. Our analysis suggests there are two obstacles in the privatization of China's state-owned enterprises:
how to ensure the interests of those unlucky workers who were laid off in the privatization process, and how to replace the management's private benefit (managerial expenses or agency cost) by some incentive mechanisms that motivate the management to pursue profit maximization. Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. Note: ***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% percentage, respectively. 
